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INTRODUCTION
MR. ELLMAN:
Good afternoon. My name is Michael Ellman. I am a solici-
tor in London - that is an attorney - and I have, up to now,
been Chair of the Defence of the Defence Commission of the
UIA, the Union International des Avocats.
I would like to say how pleased and honored we are to have
been asked to run this seminar. We have been working for the
freedom of lawyers throughout the world to practice their pro-
fession free of persecution and interference by the authorities,
which in many countries of this world, unfortunately, is not
very simple. Many lawyers are severely persecuted.
1
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I will just say a very few words before introducing our
speakers about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1
which of course was a wonderful symbol arising out of the ashes
of World War II, out of the ashes of the fascism and racism that
had been destroyed in that conflict.
It was at its time a tremendous advance, setting out aims
and aspirations of all the peoples for a free society in which peo-
ple's full rights, social and economic as well as civil and polit-
ical, would be recognized and given effect.
It was, of course, what we call first-generation rights, fairly
basic rights. But, looking back on it, they do have a very broad
coverage, even if rights that we would consider important nowa-
days, such as sexual orientation, as was mentioned a few min-
utes ago, and others were not, of course, thought of at that time.
But for its time it was a remarkable document, and it was
the precursor both of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 2 the Inter-American Convention, and the two major
United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 3 and
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 4 which filled out a lot of
the details necessary to give full effect to those rights, and, most
importantly, put in place mechanisms for the enforcement of
those rights.
So looking back at the Declaration, it is salutary to note
how far-reaching those rights already were, although in most
countries in those days, and even today, they are very far from
realization - the right to privacy, to freedom of movement and
resident, freedom of thought, conscience, freedom of expression,
and so forth - and the social and economic rights - right to
work, to protection against unemployment, rights of leisure,
holidays with pay, equal pay for equal work, the right to an ade-
quate standard of living, health, food, housing, et cetera.
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N.Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S.
222, art. 26 [hereinafter European Convention].
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted Dec. 19,
1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 16 [hereinafter Political Covenant].
4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1996, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.
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In 1948, many of these rights must have seemed quite un-
attainable to most people, and yet the states were prepared to
sign up to them. There were no enforcement proceedings, no
sanctions, but it was the beginning of a movement which has
now given rise to the procedures and to a lot of case law that we
have in effect now, and has come through the regional conven-
tions particularly.
In the last ten years, with the collapse of the Iron Curtain,
we have been in Europe - countries from Russia to Portugal
and from Iceland to Turkey - accepting the jurisdiction of the
European Court, even in Britain, which was one of the first to
sign the European Convention,5 but has nevertheless been one
of the countries most frequently condemned by the European
Court of Human Rights for breaches of that Convention.
Up until now, we have had to change our law each time we
were found in breach of the Convention, and it has been an im-
portant point that we have, and every country in Europe has,
changed their law every time they are found in breach - except
on one occasion, I am afraid, when we entered a reservation to
the Convention because they told us that seven days was too
long to keep people in detention without charge, and under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, unfortunately, that is still allowed.
But we are now finally incorporating the European Conven-
tion 6 into our domestic law, a belated recognition that the pro-
tection of human rights in Britain is not always all it has been
cracked up to be. And now, the government and the local munic-
ipal authorities are getting worried that they may actually have
to account for their actions, or failures to act, which up to now
they have generally not been obligated to do.
So considerable advances are being made, even though in
Europe, as elsewhere, practice is often a long way behind the
law, and particularly in a domain like human rights, where gov-
ernments are always finding ways of restricting people's rights
as fast as new rights are being established and incorporated
into law.
But the fact that they are so incorporated and that sanc-
tions exist on an international level - not only for perpetrators
5 European Convention, supra note 2.
6 Id.
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of torture, mass murder, and crimes against the laws of war;
but also for those, including governments, who deny right of
free expression or right to bail and to fair trial; and, to a limited
extent, our rights to basic health care, education, and a roof
over our heads - all this is an enormous advance.
This summer we have seen the International Criminal
Court voted to be set up, and in the last couple of weeks, the
Pinochet case,7 which has been a tremendous advance, even
though he has not yet been extradited. But the very fact that a
former dictator can be called to account before a court of law has
already had a huge effect in the world. I am told that "Papa
Doc" Duvalier, the former dictator of Haiti, has suddenly disap-
peared in France and nobody knows where he is. So things are
happening.
On another point, for many years we in Britain and many
countries in Europe, and maybe you in the United States, have
been presenting counter-reports to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee, counter-reports to our governments' reports.
When the governments say how wonderful everything is and
how they are making great progress, we have put in a counter-
report to show that actually things are not so good. The United
Nations Human Rights Committee is also very appreciative of
this. This we have done mainly on the Civil and Political Rights
Convention," but last year, for the first time, it was also done on
the Economic and Social and Cultural Rights, 9 led by OXFAM 10
and a number of other British NGOs. 11
The Economic and Social Council of the U.N. wanted to
know why in a developed country like Britain there are more
and more beggars on the streets, why tuberculosis has reap-
peared thirty years after it was eradicated, and university tui-
tion is no longer free, and so forth. These are things that it
7 Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metroplis and
Others Ex Parte Pinochet, 37 I.L.M 1302 (United Kingdom House of Lords 1998).
8 Political Covenant, supra note 3.
9 Economic Covenant, supra note 4.
10 Oxfam's objectives are to relieve, poverty, distress and suffering in any part
of the world, and to educate the public concerning the nature, causes and effects of
poverty. Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Cli-
mate Change Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. INTL ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 115, 137 n.19 (1998).
11 Nongovernmental organization (NGO).
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would have been unthinkable a few years ago for an interna-
tional body to take interest in.
And so, progress is being made, although there is still a
long way to go.
As I say, we are fighting for the freedom of lawyers to prac-
tice freely worldwide. Last month, we had a success in Kenya,
where our colleague, Juma Kiplenge was charged. The magis-
trate was reported in the press as saying, "I'm going to convict
that guy no matter what the evidence." The Attorney General
finally stepped in and canceled the prosecution - "It was noth-
ing to do with international protest," he said, "it was merely in-
ternal procedure." So our efforts are never recognized, but we
do sometimes get some successes.
But on the other hand, I heard the day before yesterday
that Nejib Hosni in Tunis, who has already been persecuted
and imprisoned for two or three years and was released only
last year, has been re-arrested. We do not know on what
trumped-up charges. So we still have got to be constantly
vigilant.
We, as lawyers with training and experience to see through
the blandishments of the powers that be, must be at the fore-
front of the fight to maintain our liberties, which the creators of
this Universal Declaration set in train fifty years ago.
I think you have heard enough from me. I would like to
introduce our colleagues who are going to speak to you about
the Universal Declaration in their regions of the world. First,
my Co-Moderator, Paul Nemo, the Director of the Human
Rights Projects of the UIA, from Paris; Abderrahim Jamai,
Batonnier, President of the Bar of Kenitra in Morocco; Dr.
Muhamed Mugraby, who is a Vice President of our Commission
of the Defence, comes from Beirut, Lebanon; and Abogado Euge-
nio Gay Montalvo, from Spain, the President of the Abogacia
Espafiola and the UIA Human Rights Commission.
First I will ask Batonnier Jamai to speak to you in French,
and I will try to summarize what he has to say in English.
1999]
5
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss1/7
Abderrahim Jamai
Bdtonnier, Bar of Kenitra, Morocco
Mr. Jamai made his presentation in French. Mr. Ellman pro-
vided a summary in English.
MR. ELLMAN:
First of all, Maitre Jamai thanks you very much for asking
him [to speak]. He is very pleased to come with his two col-
leagues to the U.S.A. to speak about the human rights situation
on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration.1
He is not a spokesman for the Moroccan Bar, but he has
been involved both in Morocco and in other countries, particu-
larly in Burundi, with the human rights situation, and he has
been able to observe and to draw some lessons from what is not
a brilliant situation and not one with which we can be self-
satisfied.
Each country, of course, is different. There are various as-
pects of the governments in each country and the powers that
be - the police, the administrative powers, and the media. In
some countries there are national human rights institutions,
and of course it is the duty of the state to protect human rights
and also to take measures to alleviate the social and economic
situation so that people can enjoy their human rights in full.
But at the same time, in many countries the state is often the
biggest violator of human rights.
Looking at the traditional division of legislative, adminis-
trative, and judicial power of the state, it is of course vital that,
just as the judicial system be independent of the state power
and also independent of sectoral interests in the public in soci-
ety, the legislative, on the other hand, must represent public
opinion and must ensure compliance with international laws.
Another most important aspect is the institutions of civil
society - NGOs, the press, and so on - which must exercise
great vigilance and must keep in constant consultation and me-
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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diation with the public. The NGOs, in fact, can be a great bul-
wark of human rights, but they have a responsibility to ensure
that they only put out accurate and well-checked information
and that they keep independent of the government and of polit-
ical parties and other particular interests.
In Morocco, Mr. Jamai has witnessed violations of human
rights over many years, disappearances, arbitrary arrests of
trade unionists and others, kidnappings and so on. But re-
cently, there has been some progress. There has been a Na-
tional Human Rights Commission set up, and NGOs
independent of government and of political parties have been
able to flourish. There have been a number of releases from
prison and some of the disappeared people have actually
reappeared.
The Moroccan State has ratified a number of treaties, in-
cluding the Convention Against Torture,2 the Convention
Against Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 3 the
Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,4 and
others.
At the same time, he has, as he mentioned, been involved in
Burundi, where he has seen a number of very unfair trials fol-
lowing the genocide in that country. Here he suggests that law-
yers, and the UIA in particular, can help by going to the country
and assisting in the reestablishment of an independent legal
profession.
And then, he referred briefly to the question of impunity.
He points out, as I mentioned a little while ago, that there are
Pinochets not only in Chile but in many countries of the world,
and many of them have been protected, as indeed it is suggested
that Pinochet himself was, by the great powers, the United
States and other great powers, and we must be vigilant to see
that this does not go on.
2 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. 100-
20 (1988).
3 Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, S. Exec.Rep. No. 103-38 1994, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
4 The International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C. 95-2, (1978), 660
U.N.T.S. 195.
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The UIA, he suggests, should not be satisfied with collect-
ing subscriptions and enrolling more bars and individuals as
members, but must go to the countries and see the situations on
the ground and ensure that in the 21st century we have a
greater respect for human rights than we have seen during this
century.
In the circumstance he is limiting himself to these com-
ments, for which we are most grateful.
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Eugenio Gay Montalvo
Abogacia Espafola, UIA Human Rights Commission
It is an honor for me, as President of the General Council of
the Bar of Spain and as President of the Human Rights Com-
mission of the Union International des Avocats, to have been
invited to this prestigious university, the cradle of distin-
guished jurists, and to be able to share with you all some brief
reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was
born out of the imperative need of the international community
to seek a global and effective protection for the human rights
that had been so repeatedly violated during the two world wars.
Since then, the international community has made rather
uneven progress in terms of the protection and promotion of
human rights. Violations of human rights and breaches of in-
ternational humanitarian law are still occurring in many parts
of the world, and in some cases, such as Cambodia, the former
Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, these violations have been so outra-
geous that they could well be classed as genocide and crimes
against humanity, and some eminent jurists have in fact done
SO.
Despite such atrocities, however, despite the fact that vari-
ous countries insist on contesting the universality of human
rights, and notwithstanding the rebuffs received by the interna-
tional protection system set up by the United Nations, it is no
less true that these fifty years have seen a steady, sustained
advance in the protection and promotion of human rights.
The conviction that people have certain inalienable rights
arising out of the very dignity that distinguishes them as such,
rights that are worthy of the utmost recognition and respect,
has become one of the underlying traits of our culture and our
civilization.
This is due to the fact that such categories of human rights
encapsulate more than just political principles and legal formu-
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
11
PACE INT'L L. REV.
lae; in the heart of them beats a profound moral sense, which
was so adroitly summed up by the Preamble of the Universal
Declaration when it said that their content is "the common
standard of achievement for which all peoples should strive."2
As such a "common standard of achievement," the Declara-
tion has left its mark in several treaties and conventions
adopted in different parts of the world, Europe being one of the
pioneers in the supranational protection of human rights.
This new attitude towards human rights began to make its
presence found in Spain from the democratic transition on-
wards, with sweeping changes in both legislation and praxis,
but without any doubt its most important reflection is to be
found in the Constitution of 6 December 1978, whose twentieth
anniversary we are celebrating this year.
The Preamble and Articles 1, 2, and 9 show us which
human rights the Constitution has in its sights and lays down
the grounds for recognizing them.
Article 10.1 of the Spanish Constitution, with a wording
that adds a notable aesthetic verve to its ethical force, says:
"The dignity of the person, the inviolable rights that are inher-
ent thereto, the free development of the personality, respect for
law and the rights of others as the bases upon which political
order and social peace are built."
Article 10.2 of our Constitution, which states as follows,
"Rules relating to the fundamental rights and freedoms recog-
nized by the Constitution shall be interpreted in accordance
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the inter-
national treaties and agreements on the same matter ratified by
Spain," serves as a nexus between our own system of fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the international
conventions and treaties that Spain is party to, on the other.
It does not give constitutional status to proclaimed interna-
tional rights and freedoms unless they are also proclaimed by
our Constitution, but it binds us to interpret the corresponding
precepts of the latter in accordance with the contents of said
treaties or conventions.
If we analyze specifically the rights embraced by the Span-
ish Constitution, we find a clear parallel with those included in
2 Id. at Universal Declaration Preamble.
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, practically the
same being recognized. Witness the following examples:
Equality before the law, recognized in Article 14 of the Spanish
Constitution and Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the right to life and security of persons, recog-
nized in Article 15 of the Spanish Constitution and Articles 3
and 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, et cetera.
Essentially, both the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948 and the Spanish Constitution of 1978 define the
sense of justice that political forces should safeguard.
In the year marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights and the twentieth anniversary
of the Constitution, Spain stands firm in its commitment to un-
dertake significant actions in favor of the protection of human
rights - not only in Spain itself, but also in other countries
where a positive influence can help to mitigate serious viola-
tions of personal dignity.
The public at large, organized in institutions, organiza-
tions, political parties, unions, et cetera, can also contribute to-
wards improving the situation of human rights in Spain.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains,
therefore, a powerful common standard that all peoples should
aim at. It has not done away with human oppression single-
handedly, but it is a guide, a promise, a challenge.
Its approval marked the end of the idea whereby the "sover-
eignty of the state" balked any analysis from the outside of the
violations of human rights committed therein. It demands ac-
tion; it lays the responsibility for defending human rights on the
whole society, across the board: individuals, organizations, gov-
ernments, and international bodies.
It has been called "the best-kept secret in the world," and
yet it should be brought to bear on the way all of us lead our
lives. Few are aware of its contents; fewer still have even seen a
copy, but it is a document available all the world over.
It controls, theoretically, the policies of the governments
and is above them all. World leaders are bound to observe it,
while corporations and financial houses should promote it in
their commercial dealings.
For many, however, especially for victims of human rights
violations, it might be merely an old, forgotten, or ignored, dust-
1999]
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covered document on a New York bookshelf. But it is also true
that international organizations and courts and the interna-
tional community as a whole have made sure that an ongoing,
daily improvement in the field of human rights is a palpable
reality.
Fifty years later, the world is closer to the goal of achieving
"all human rights for all people" and millions of people are
working away to this end, even though indifference and a scorn
for human rights continues to give rise to barbarous acts that
are an outrage to the conscience of mankind.
I would like to conclude, therefore, by saying that this anni-
versary cries out for the international community to overcome
the existing indifference and finally bring into being, once and
for all, the International Criminal Court that would enforce
strict compliance with the rights laid down in the Declaration
and related texts by judging and penalizing any serious
breaches of fundamental rights.
[Vol. 11:173
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Dr. Muhamed Mugraby
Vice President, UIA Commission of the Defence,
Beirut, Lebanon*
My Fellow Humans
When one speaks on this great occasion celebrating the 5 0 '
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' the
speech cannot possibly be meant for any particular audience.
For such a speaker, as the one standing before you, is one
human being who cannot see in his audience anything other
than human beings of equal dignity and standing.
It is my intention to address the conditions of human rights
in the Middle East, which suffer from a tragic denial. 2 This
state of affairs must be a cause for grave concern to all human-
kind. It is of equal concern, however, that there is not one na-
tion on Earth, including virtually all democratic and developed
industrial nations, that is in full compliance with the articles of
the Declaration and the Covenants.
INTRODUCTION
The eternal human quest for freedom, justice and peace is
firmly documented in the history of mankind. It is embodied in
ancient philosophy and in all known religions. Time and time
* Dr. Mugraby generously submitted a written transcript of the paper he
presented at the Celebration. It is that paper, Denial of Human Rights in the Mid-
dle East: Causes and Agenda for Remedy, which is printed here. Notably, his re-
marks at the Celebration did not vary substantially - if at all - from this paper.
1 G.A. Res., 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
2 In the presentation to follow it will be noticed that references to the state of
human rights in Israel are limited. The reason is that the speaker has little or no
reliable access to knowledge about what goes on in Israel. Therefore, he has relied
largely on reports by international human rights NGOs on Israel, which are of
limited focus. As a citizen of Lebanon he is at such a knowledge disadvantage
because there is no cultural or any other civilized exchange between the two neigh-
boring countries. As long as Lebanese are not permitted to travel to Israel and
Israelis may not come to Lebanon, there will be little or no chance for any signifi-
cant human or civil dialogue furthering the cause of human rights among the two
nations.
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again this quest was translated into a call for delivering
humans from oppression and servitude: different peoples, differ-
ent races, different regions, but always human beings who suf-
fered from the denial of freedom (based on equality), justice
(founded in compassion) and peace (characterized by humanity,
tolerance and comprehensiveness).
In modern times, and perhaps beginning with the French
Revolution, the quest for freedom, justice and peace increas-
ingly took the shape of a secular message, truly transcending
the bounds of religions, nationalities and regions. The horrors
of the Second World War, during which the rise of racism led to
the Holocaust, opened the way to the birth of the United Na-
tions and the inevitable proclamation of the Universal Declara-
tion, which was partly authored by a great man from the Middle
East and my country, Lebanon, Dr. Charles Malik.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS DENIED
Based on the above premises, one would think that the
universality of the Declaration, its genius articulation of a his-
torical human message already firmly rooted, and the detailed
provisions of the Covenants that followed in the form of interna-
tional treaties, would have come upon fertile ground in the Mid-
dle East. But alas, and on this 50th anniversary of the
Declaration, the Middle East is not exactly a haven for freedom,
justice and peace. Is it possible that the Declaration could have
had the opposite effect in the Region?
On December 10, 1948, the Arab- Israeli military conflict
was in progress. A few months later it came to a temporary halt
with an armistice, not peace, only to be followed by many more
wars in 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and the ongoing mini-wars in
the West bank and South Lebanon; so much for peace.
As for freedom and justice, volumes upon volumes of re-
ports by international human rights monitoring International
Government Organizations ("IGOs") and Non-governmental Or-
ganizations ("NGOs") testify to the routine violation of the basic
rights guaranteed by the Declaration and the Covenants. A se-
ries of military coups d'Etat transformed many countries of the
Middle East into the ranks of oppressive authoritarian regimes
that had no interest in freedom, justice or peace, but quite the
contrary. In fact that was the very foundation of their undemo-
[Vol. 11:177
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cratic systems. Where there are no military dictatorships you
find royal or theocratic rule founded on similar denial of rights.
Where one of these governments represents itself as a democ-
racy, beware for this is the age of false and fabricated ballots.
For democratic mechanics, elections, parliaments and other ac-
cessories, are used just to display the brand name "democracy"
as a thin cover to the crushing of basic rights, denial of justice
and evasion of peace. Why is that, and what went wrong?
II. CAUSES OF DENIAL
History tells us that progress toward the full recognition of
human and civil rights in Europe and North America was ulti-
mately made possible in an environment of viable democratic
institutions under a secular rule of law following the separation
of church and state. For example, the historic civil rights move-
ment in the United States in the 1960s could not have taken
root and triumphed had it not been for the role of the independ-
ent judiciary and the freely elected members of the United
States Congress who were duly responsive to the wishes of their
constituents.
It is evident that there is a prevailing environment in the
Middle East which is not only undemocratic but also not condu-
cive to the emergence of true secular democracies. In fact the
denial of human rights and the lack of democracy are twin phe-
nomena which threaten one and the same human value. It fol-
lows that progress on democracy must lead to progress on
human rights, and the upholding of human rights makes de-
mocracy inevitable. For the rulers who deny human rights to
their people are not democratically elected and practice no
democracy.
I submit that the above described sad state of affairs is the
result of a number of causes which, in their turn, were brought
into existence by powerful forces, prime among which are: (1)
the religions, (2) the security doctrine, (3) the military, (4) the
media, (5) the international community, (6) the national courts,
(7) the culture of corruption, and (8) the human rights
organizations.
1999]
17
PACE INT'L L. REV.
A. The Religions
It is popular in some quarters to talk in this context of one
religion, Islam, and how Islamic extremists favor terrorism and
threaten world peace and Western interests. There has also
been much theorization by certain writers on the seemingly in-
herent incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Much of
this talk is manifestly prejudiced and some of it has the obvious
motive of justifying the unconscionable relations between West-
ern governments and certain authoritarian governments that
allegedly base their laws and policies on Islam according to
their self-serving interpretations! The supporting argument for
this doctrine is so simplistic that it could easily apply to all
religions.
I submit that Islam and all other religions in the Middle
East do not pose, by themselves and purely as religions, any
impediment to human rights. The true and formidable impedi-
ment lies in the role that many religious organizations and
leaders are exercising in the civil and political life of the Region.
Such a substantial role and status for religions in the Mid-
dle East is not at all understandable to most outside observers
and is not always so clear to the people of the Region. For a
starter, there are not just three major religions in the Middle
East. In fact there are more than twenty active different reli-
gious establishments that constitute, for all practical purposes,
autonomous religions or religious entities. As an example quite
representative of the area, nineteen such entities are officially
recognized in Lebanon, but this list excludes almost all Protes-
tant Churches, Buddhists Bahaiis, Ahmadis, and other existing
religions with some followers in the country. The Saudi policy
of recognizing only one religion, a Hanbali sub-school of Sunni
Islam, and banning all others, is unique and not at all
representative.
The fact is that the status and role of the Christian
churches and the Jewish rabbinates was decreed fourteen cen-
turies ago by the Islamic Caliphate based on the teachings of
the Prophet Muhamad. It was a major step in the quest for
freedom, justice and peace which had more limited precedents
in Roman and Persian times. The Prophet taught that the reli-
gious organizations of the Christians, Jews and other peoples of
the book, i.e. all organized religions, had the right to be let alone
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in full autonomy. Consequently each of the Christian churches
and Jewish rabbinates took the status of quasi states under the
Islamic Caliphate which to some extent resembled a federation.
Not only did they continue their religious structure without gov-
ernmental interference, but they took the right to have and en-
act their own religious laws and form their own courts.
Furthermore, they were assured jurisdiction over their respec-
tive religious communities in all matters related to personal
status and family law. They even had their own prisons and
could issue and enforce prison sentences on their "subjects."
Lastly they acted as the political and commercial representa-
tives of, and spokesmen for, their communities before the
Prince, whether a Caliph, a Sultan or a King. Taxes were often
collected through the churches and rabbinates.
This autonomous communal system of religions survived
without interruption till the collapse of the last Islamic Cali-
phate, the Ottoman Sultanate. Surprisingly, while the emerg-
ing Republic of Turkey took on the status of a strictly secular
state, the system continued unabated, and managed to increase
its power, in the other states of the Middle East that seceded
from the Ottomans.
Although the system called for religions other than Islam to
organize on their own, outside the boundaries of the official gov-
ernment structure, the Islamic religious structure had to re-
main an integral part of the state. This, in addition to
autonomy, had the following results:
(1) The government embraced only one sect and theological
school of Islam, under the Ottomans, the Sunni sect accord-
ing to the Hanafi School. Hence other Islamic sects had to
organize on their own outside the umbrella of the Sultanate,
learning from the Christian and the Jewish models. But un-
like the Christians and the Jews, they were not recognized or
accorded any autonomy, and they were often suppressed or
even persecuted.
(2) The patriarchs, bishops and rabbis exercised autonomous
temporal powers as princes and virtual rulers of their respec-
tive communities, and continue to exert every effort to main-
tain that position.
(3) Whenever the opportunity arose after the collapse of the Ot-
toman Sultanate, leaderships of autonomous religious com-
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munities, whether having been officially recognized by the
Sultanate such as the Christian and Jewish, or unrecog-
nized, such as the Shiites and Alawis (originally known as
"Nussairis"), took all the power they could seize. In Iran
(which was not part of the Ottoman Empire) the Jaafari Shi-
ite clerics took over everything. In Syria the Alawis assumed
supreme political and military power. In Lebanon the
churches, whose leaders are already treated like heads of
state, openly participate in the political process in violation
of the secular constitution. In concert with Islamic religious
communities, most Lebanese Christian church leaders op-
pose modernization in any way that could infringe on their
powers. Israel was established as a Jewish state, and the
power of the Rabbinates is far reaching; open conflict be-
tween religious and secular forces continues unabated. This
may be one of the reasons why Israel does not have a written
constitution that could challenge the age old authority of the
original Jewish religious establishment.
The impact of the communal religious system is far reach-
ing. What started as a reform fourteen centuries ago has
turned into a living nightmare with many features that are di-
rectly in open conflict with the universality and meaning of
human rights as spelled out in the Declaration, to wit:
(1) Sectarianism is in charge, which translates into open and in-
stitutionalized discrimination. Citizenship does not exist in-
dependent of religious affiliation.
(2) Freedom of speech must give way to the views of the religious
leaders, who know better because they are closer to divinity,
sometimes under the penalty of death. The famous threat to
the life of Salman Rushdie 3 could have come just as easily
from a Christian or a Jewish religious authority in the Mid-
dle East.
(3) Basic rights could only be fully accepted within the religious
community, as every community has to fend for itself on its
own. Hence there could be no recognition of equality among
human beings as human beings.
(4) There could be no equal rights for women as required by the
Declaration, the Covenants and other international treaties.
3 Salman Rushdie, author of THE SATANIC VERSES (1988).
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Such rights depend on the religious laws of each of the auton-
omous communities.
(5) Intermarriage is discouraged, very difficult to enter into, and
occasionally hazardous to the spouses involved. There are no
modern civil laws in the Middle East providing for civil mar-
riage. The right to license and celebrate weddings is one of
the most dearly protected privileges of the autonomous
communities.
II. THE SECURITY DOCTRINE
In the Middle East, human rights are much of the time set
aside under the pretext of national security. Whether it is the
security of the undemocratic regime or mere sectarian security,
the outcome is the same: human rights denied.
To emphasize the national security cause or repression,
political and other prisoners are regularly tried before military
and special security courts that have little or no regard for due
process. Such courts are active in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, the
Israeli administered Palestinian territories, Palestinian Au-
thority and most other countries of the region. In Israel judges
of regular courts often listen to police and/or army officers ex-
plaining the security angle of situations, particularly when it
concerns Palestinians and Israeli settlers. The Israeli Supreme
Court has declined many times to rule favorably or to intervene
on petitions by lawyers representing Palestinian prisoners actu-
ally being tortured under interrogation. Israeli gunners scored
a direct hit in South Lebanon on a prefabricated building, in a
United Nations compound, full of scared civilian refugees,
which resulted in the loss of more than a hundred innocent
lives, mostly women and children. Such contempt by many ele-
ments of the Israeli Army for the human rights of "others" is
reciprocated by groups (consisting mainly of Islamic extremists)
fighting the Israelis in South Lebanon and elsewhere.
Members of the legal profession are also affected by the na-
tional security doctrine. Lebanese prisoners in both Syria and
Israel have no access to lawyers and lawyers appointed to assist
them are often denied access. Disciplinary charges were
brought by the Cairo Bar against an Egyptian lawyer who
dared represent the alleged Israeli spy Azzam Azzam in bizarre
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proceedings before an Egyptian state security court.4 The Leba-
nese Government attempted to prosecute a Lebanese lawyer
who argued before a Beirut Military Court that Israel does not
fit the legal definition of the "enemy" for purposes of enforcing
the penal code, on the ground of endangering the morale of the
armed forces. Defenders are regularly harassed and it is very
hard for persons charged with security related crimes as "col-
laboration with the enemy" to find lawyers who will agree to
represent them. Even if they do it is almost impossible for such
lawyers to make a serious and credible defense on their clients'
behalf. Even in non-security related matters lawyers are easily
intimidated as evidenced in a recent case in Lebanon. When a
Lebanese Jew who occupies a sensitive position in an interna-
tional organization earned the wrath of former prime minister
Hariri by publicly criticizing the high level of corruption in the
country, his lawyers in landlord-tenants cases in Sidon were in-
timidated into dropping him as a client, for fear of being ac-
cused of sending money to Israel. How easy it is for human
beings, for their own selfish interests, to dehumanize other
human beings!
III. THE MILITARY
The glorification of the military is a Middle Eastern phe-
nomenon of major negative consequences to democracy and
human rights. Former military officers play major roles as
leaders, co-leaders or policy makers in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt,
Sudan, Yemen, Israel and Lebanon. In North Africa the same
phenomenon exists in Tunisia and Algeria. Following the war of
1948, military uprisings took the helm of government from the
hands of civilians in Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, and Iraq.
The Lebanese army commander has just been made president.
In Israel the army has long been a national icon with super cre-
dentials arising out of a series of military successes in the
Israel-Arab wars. In a country long living in an ocean of hostil-
ity, many Israeli army generals look forward to shiny political
careers upon their retirement. The same wars that gave the
4 Abdeen Phelony Court, August 31, 1997, case # 1594197. The Egyptian
Court convicted Azzam Azzam of spying against Egypt to Israeli Mossad and was
sentenced for 15 years in jail with hard labor. Al-Ayyam, Arabic News.com (visited
Mar.10, 1999) <http://www.hebron. com/article04-09-06-987.html>.
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political advantage to Israeli officers boosted the careers of of-
ficers in the armies of neighboring countries they once fought
against.
With very few exceptions, Middle Eastern military com-
manders have proven to be natural enemies of human rights.
The Israeli-Arab military and political confrontation has pro-
vided the most tragic framework to human rights abuses by
both sides.
IV. THE MEDIA
Middle Eastern media has played a central role in an ongo-
ing campaign of misinformation and trade in hate. Most of the
printed media is owned by governments and the few publica-
tions which are not are either corrupted by government money
or by fear of ruthless repression. TV and radio broadcasting is
no better. More recently, satellite channels available to televi-
sion have experienced the same fate. It is unfortunate, but it is
certain beyond a shadow of a doubt that the dissemination of
information to the people of the Region is influenced financially
by the governments (of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and
other wealthy Gulf states), on the one hand, and/or is at the
mercy of the daggers and guns of assassins working for the said,
or other, governments or armed extremists groups.
Unfortunately, the media does not only fail miserably in
performing its duty to bring unbiased information, news and
opinion to the people, but it lies to them and distracts their at-
tention from the real and local causes of their misery and the
denial of their basic rights. The media gives a political advan-
tage to the oppressive ruling regimes: people who are denied
their human rights are brainwashed by the media in such a way
as to shift the responsibility and blame to external culprits and
scapegoats that their leaders would like them to hate. More-
over, the media supports the manifestations and tactics of the
religious communal system, legitimizing the national security
basis of oppression, and portrays the very concept of universal
human rights as alien to the national culture and a tool of West-
ern political policies aimed at destroying their indigenous way
of life.
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V. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
It is regrettable that the international community, led by
the big powers, has done all the wrong things with the effect of
supporting the above-described state of affairs. Western govern-
ments, in particular, have done and continue without regret to
do business as usual with regimes that deny human rights to
their own people. They have given their direct and indirect sup-
port to the corrupt media. They have recognized military ad-
venturers as legitimate leaders. And they miserably failed to
lift a finger in the defense of beleaguered human rights in the
Middle East. That role is best described in the 1998 report of
Human Rights Watch:
[g]overnments of the larger industrialized countries generally
paid scant public attention to human rights issues in the Middle
East. Their chief interests were access to oil, natural gas, and
export markets ....
One of the reasons publicly advanced in the West for this
regrettable apathy is deference to "Islamic sensibilities," an ob-
vious reference to the above described religious communal sys-
tem. In fact, they are the same Western governments that were
responsible for the survival of that system after the collapse of
the Ottoman Sultanate. At that time, the League of Nations
placed Iraq, Jordan and Palestine under the British Mandate
and Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate. Egypt and
the Sudan were already under British occupation. Under the
terms of the mandate, Britain and France were supposed to
guide those nations in the democratic ways, but instead their
choice was to maintain the status quo ante of the autonomous
communities. Thus the communal religious system breathed
new life and actually thrived under the mandate.
For example, it was the French High Commissioner for
Lebanon and Syria who issued a decree 5 naming eighteen reli-
gious denominations as officially organized and entitled to the
special privileges within the system. Very recently, the Coptic
Church of Egypt was added to the list and its leader began mak-
ing regular long visits to Lebanon complete with political state-
5 Decree No. LIV61 (March 13, 1926).
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ments. Something similar took place in Jordan, Iraq and
Palestine which was inherited intact by the State of Israel.
Deference to "Islamic sensibilities" is a mere excuse for fail-
ure to make the choices mandated by the Declaration and inter-
national law. The best illustration can be found in comparing
the Western position on Islamic law in the Sudan with that of
Saudi Arabia. Under the presidency of General Jaafar
Numeiri, a chapter on Islamic punishments was added to the
otherwise modern penal code of Sudan. This raised very few
eyebrows in the international community. Soon after, a highly
respected Sudanese scholar was charged with apostasy, con-
victed and publicly executed. No big deal! When a new govern-
ment came to power in the Sudan heavily influenced by the
Turabi party of Islamists, hell broke loose over the same penal
code! In the meantime, and across the Red Sea in Saudi Arabia,
there is nothing but Islamic punishments applied to Saudis and
foreigners alike and scoring the highest rate of executions in the
world. In Saudi Arabia there is no due process, no right to
counsel, nothing. In a recent case documented by Human
Rights Watch a Syrian worker in the Kingdom, a member of an
ancient Sufi sect, was executed on charges of witchcraft for pos-
session of an amulet cherished by Sufis. The evil character of
the amulet was established from the expert testimony of the
Committee for the Enforcement of Virtue and Prevention of
Vice, a huge Saudi religious police organization. There was no
trial in any sense of the word and when the poor man was exe-
cuted he was not aware that he had been sentenced. Is this the
kind of sensibilities that the United States and other Western
governments wish to protect?
VI. THE NATIONAL CouRTs
For all the above mentioned reasons, and the impossibility
of an independent judiciary without democratic government,
national courts in the Middle East have failed to play an effec-
tive role in defending human rights. Where the rule of law ex-
isted in theory, it has not at all been upheld in practice,
especially when confronted with alleged religious or national se-
curity imperatives.
The role of military and security courts all over the Region
has already been mentioned. I have also cited the impotence of
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Israel's Supreme Court, as well as other regular courts, in the
face of the national security doctrine justifying, among other
things, the regular practice of torture.
In Egypt, a Cairo court of appeals (June, 1995) declared
the dissolution of the marriage of Dr. Nasr Abou Zaid and his
wife Dr. Ibtihal Younis, 6 both Egyptian university professors,
against their will, for apostasy (i.e. on purely fundamentalist
religious grounds). This decision is not the work of some
bearded religious clerics with ideas that belong in prehistoric
times. It was, surprisingly, authored by a panel of three
learned and senior civil judges who graduated from civil law
schools, and made part of a sophisticated judicial system on the
continental model.
The case came before the high judicial panel on appeal from
a lower court that had rejected the action brought by an unre-
lated third party (another college instructor). The plaintiff ap-
pealed and the appellate court ruled that Dr. Abou Zaid, as
evidenced from many of his published scholarly writings, had
indeed committed apostasy and that any Muslim was entitled to
sue for the dissolution of the marriage.
The panel emphasized that the Egyptian state was not sec-
ular, atheist, or Christian, but Muslim. Hence it considered any
attack on what is sacred in Islam as an attack on the state. Dr.
Abou Zaid was quoted extensively as ridiculing religious belief
in the existence of devils and finis, and the court found such
quotations to be an affront to Islam.
Furthermore, the appellate court found Dr. Abou Zaid's call
for upholding positive law over religious law as more evidence
of his apostasy. Most significantly, the court, in finding, Dr.
Abou Zaid guilty of the crime of apostasy (punishable by death
in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Sudan) declared that Islamic punish-
ments were indeed still in force as part of the law.
In Lebanon courts are prohibited from refusing to enforce
statutes for conflict with the constitution. Hence they are pre-
cluded from playing any effective role in protecting and enforc-
ing the constitutional guarantees to civil and human rights as
provided in the Lebanese constitution. Although Lebanese
courts are under the statutory duty of enforcing international
6 Case # 287 for the judicial year 111, June 14. 1995.
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conventions over local statutes, they become suddenly impotent
when it comes to human rights.
Examples of flawed justice are abundant. An informative
summary introduction to the subject is contained in a recent re-
port by Amnesty International. 7
VII. THE CULTURE OF CORRUPTION
The above-described causes for the denial of human rights
have also given rise to a culture of corruption in the rulers and
cronies. Some of the regimes in question are corrupt in simply
taking advantage of naked power to achieve rapid and enor-
mous private enrichment. Other regimes see corruption as a
useful tool of government. As long as all senior public servants
and security commanders are busy making illicit money, they
have no time to plot against the regime and no moral grounds
for criticizing their superiors.
It is no secret that enormous wealth generated by astro-
nomical oil revenues in the oil producing parts of the Region
was largely blundered. The absence of natural resources has
not presented any problem to corrupt rulers and officials in
most other Middle Eastern countries, but to those who had to
work harder in stealing from the less abundant means of their
poorer nations. For example, an enterprising prime minister of
resources-poor Lebanon, with a contracting business of his own
in Saudi Arabia, was suspected of being a mere front for the
ruling family, caused the country to run into public debt of
nearly $20 billion within six years of his tenure and, within the
same period, was able to appropriate together with his associ-
ates public properties and wealth in amounts estimated to ex-
ceed $10 billion. This prompted the World Bank to declare that
corruption in Lebanon had exceeded the level it had reached in
Indonesia.
Corruption creates a very powerful and obvious incentive to
jeopardize democracy, and hence human rights, for fear of
accountability.
7 See AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, State Injustice: Unfair Trials in the
Middle East and North Africa, (April, 1998).
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VIII. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
During the fifty years since the birth of the Universal Dec-
laration dozens of non-governmental human rights advocacy
groups have come into existence worldwide and many of them
have become very influential morally. Inevitably, the role of
these NGOs has been substantially confined to research and
monitoring of human rights violations. This function has been
extremely helpful in bringing out the truth about the horrible
practices of oppressive regimes around the world in general and
in the Middle East in particular.
Many of those NGOs are based in countries perceived in the
Middle East as colonial or neo-colonial powers. Hence enemies
of human rights have some illegitimate ammunition for discred-
iting their great work by accusing them directly or indirectly of
being tools of their countries policies. Such accusations are
often used as ammunition for sinister attacks on the whole sub-
ject of human rights as an instrument of Western colonialism.
It is quite encouraging that the prestige and influence of
international human rights NGOs is constantly rising as a re-
sult of their increasing external political activism in the promo-
tion of their ideals. But this activism has been mainly directed
against the known human rights violators, most of whom could
not care less. Little energy has been focused on political activ-
ism within their own countries aimed at making human rights
part of the top national interests of foreign policy of such coun-
tries. This is where international human rights violators may
be compelled to worry and to take human rights issues much
more seriously.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND AGENDA FOR ACTION
The Middle East is one region of the world with deeply
rooted pluralism. People of different religions, languages and
ethnicity have lived together for thousands of years. They are
all, and without exception, good and noble people and they all
deserve, without exception, to enjoy and exercise their human
rights in full, thus fulfilling the common and historic quest for
freedom, justice and peace.
Turning the tide that works against human rights would
simply require turning the tide that opposes freedom, democ-
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racy and peace. The people of the region are like a patient who
had an accident that confined him to bed for years, hence when
he is recovered from his original illness he must learn to do
things that came natural to him before his hospitalization, such
as walking.
The first order of business is to put an end to the control of
the media by governments and groups that spread information
and trade-in-hate. This requires the full international enforce-
ment of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights8 which prohibits any advocacy of national, ra-
cial or religious hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or
violence. The universal enforcement of this article will make
the need for the services of international criminal tribunals
against criminals, who usually base their political careers on
national, racial or religious hatred, less likely.
As a first step in this direction, I call for the setting up of
one or more impartial private and/or public international group.
This group would monitor the media, public statements by poli-
ticians and declared governmental policies for traffic in na-
tional, racial, or religious hatred aimed at inciting
discrimination, hostility or violence. I further recommend ap-
propriate international sanctions against such abuse, not only
in the Middle East but also where it equally counts (i.e. Europe
and North America).
Secondly, with the reduction and eventual removal of this
obstacle, an internationally funded human rights education
program should be launched with its own media tools and di-
rected at the people of the Region with the acquiescence, but not
direct involvement of their governments. The purpose of this
program is to teach people "how to walk" (i.e. that they can in-
deed live together in freedom, justice and peace like most of
their ancestors did).
Thirdly, a similar internationally funded program should
be created to uphold the rule of law as a national priority in
every Middle Eastern nation. The aim of the program should be
to reform the local judicial systems and establish a truly in-
dependent and effective judiciary with the integrity, training
8 Adopted Dec.19, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 16.
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and experience to be relied upon for swift and effective interven-
tion for the protection of international law. Throwing the polit-
ical weight of big powers behind such an innocent but highly
vital program will be worth more than lobbying for an arms
contract.
Fourthly, the political activism of the human rights NGOs
should be redirected and with new vigor at their own home gov-
ernments with the aim of improving and eventually perfecting
human rights compliance in such countries and commencing a
new international political initiative by the family of free na-
tions. Such initiative would have the following medium and
long-term objectives:
1. Recognizing human rights as a universally common vital in-
ternational policy interest of all nations.
2. Making the recognition and enforcement of human rights a
precondition for admission into the family of nations. Thus
nations that do not uphold human rights to the satisfaction of
the family of nations should not receive economic assistance
or become the beneficiary of any international economic, trade
or security advantages. Their leaders and officials will not
have customary immunities. They will not be admitted into
world organizations and if already admitted their member-
ship will be frozen. They will be candidates for international
sanctions.
3. Encouraging the secularization of government in the Middle
East by cutting the historic religious communal system down
to the size necessary to achieve the full separation of church
and state. In return, it should be understood that the individ-
ual constitutional and human rights of parishioners of all reli-
gious groups are fully guaranteed under the procedures of an
effective regional human rights court on the European model
and by the international community through the United
Nations.
4. Affirming, without exception, that no member of the family of
nations shall have the right to enforce, or be in the business of
enforcing religion. Enforcement of religion violates human
rights and turns religion from a question of personal convic-
tion into an instrument of coercion as a matter of perceived
religious duty by authoritarian governments, extremist pri-
vate groups and zealous individuals alike, often with hazard-
ous consequences.
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QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
QUESTION: My question is for Dr. Mugraby. You noted
that Salman Rushdie1 could have been condemned to death by
any particular country, including Christian countries. But I
would like to point out that Britain, a Christian country, is the
reason why he is alive right now because they have not arrested
him up until this time.
Since you are discussing human rights issues in the Middle
East, would you please elaborate on human rights violations in
Syria, which you seem to have left out for some strange reason?
DR. MUGRABY: I am sorry that I may have been speaking
a little bit fast, being prodded by my colleague, Mr. Ellman, and
I had to speak as fast as I could. In the process I may have not
made myself perfectly understood.
I did not say that a judgment or a sentence on Salman
Rushdie could have been issued in any Christian country. I
said the same type of fatwa could have been issued by some
Christian or Jewish authorities in the Middle East. I was not
talking about Christian countries. I do not have any classifica-
tion in my mind of countries as Christian or Moslem. I do not
believe in that.
But in the Middle East there are certain religious leaders
in all regions who feel and believe that it is their duty to enforce
the divine law, and they do it by sometimes issuing sentences.
If you would like me to give you examples about such fatwas
issued by Jewish religious leaders, I have the authority, I can do
it. And I know that, from my experience in Lebanon, that there
are some Christian religious authorities that believe that they
have the right to do the same thing.
So what I am trying to say is that there is a phenomenon of
religious establishments in the Middle East which have exer-
cised and enjoyed autonomy for centuries and centuries, and
these guys have done all right. What they understand to be
their rights interfere with the civil and human rights that we
expect a secular state to enforce.
1 Author of the book THE SATANIC VERSES (1988), which was banned in sev-
eral Islamic countries.
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QUESTIONER: Human rights abuses in Syria?
DR. MUGRABY: Human rights abuses in Syria? You want
me, coming from Lebanon, to talk about human rights abuses in
Syria?
QUESTIONER: Absolutely.
DR. MUGRABY: Don't you think that this is crazy? You
think that I will be allowed in Beirut if I criticize the human
rights abuses?
Well, let me tell you, my friend, that I am one man in Bei-
rut who stands always up to abuses by the Syrians. Before
that, I stood up to abuses by the Palestinians. I am not an eye
witness to human rights abuses in Syria, but I read regularly
reports issued by NGOs, such as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch, I am on their mailing list, and I know
that there are lots of abuses.
But as far as I am concerned, as a Lebanese, I know that
there are lots and lots of Lebanese prisoners in Syrian jails. I
may have skipped that section in my presentation, under the
prodding of Mr. Ellman, but there are lots of Lebanese prison-
ers in Syrian jails with no access to lawyers, and we have no
way of knowing their full numbers or names or conditions of
their imprisonment.
There is a smaller number in Israel, which are a little bit
more fortunate. But also, as you know, in Israel access by law-
yers is often limited and there is the power to imprison people
administratively. Well, in Syria, there is always the power to
imprison people administratively.
I do not know the number. Maybe we have a couple hun-
dred prisoners in Israel and maybe a couple/three thousand
prisoners in Syria. But, unfortunately, lawyers are denied ac-
cess and they do not have the benefit of due process of law, as
understood by lawyers who study in regular law schools.
Now, the greatest abuse in Syria, of course, is the same
abuse that you will find in all these oppressive Middle Eastern
regimes, beginning with Iraq and going to Libya, not sparing
Saudi Arabia and so forth, is that you have government by a
dictator that enforces the wishes of the governing clique by
force without any democracy and without any due process,
without the benefit of any protection to citizens. So there is no
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freedom of speech, there is no democracy, there is no square
ballot.
Of course, there were general elections in Syria only a few
days ago, and probably 99 percent of all Syrians voted. But this
is the type of false and fabricated ballot that I was referring to.
Is this sufficient?
MR. ELLMAN: Thank you. I've got a number of questions.
I will take a group of questions next and then we will try to
come back and get a bit more discussion.
QUESTION: Mr. Chairman, I do not pretend to any exper-
tise in the matter of Syrian problems, and for that matter, I do
not really have expertise in the background, although I do know
Dr. Mugraby. But I think that our questioner misunderstood
and by her question presented a very false impression of an in-
dividual who has been one of the most outspoken persons. You
cannot ask someone to actually put a noose around their neck
and jump off of a scaffold, but I will tell you that if you will read
some of Dr. Mugraby's articles, including in an American jour-
nal entitled The Middle East Quarterly, you will see a very
forthright, outspoken advocate for human rights who does not
pull punches and who does not apologize for either the country
that he hails from or others who might be there in occupation.
So I just wanted to go on record as supporting Dr. Mugraby
from the vantage point that I have.
DR. MUGRABY: Thank you very much.
MR. ELLMAN: I can bear witness to that myself as well.
QUESTION: As to the Pinochet matter, one of the issues
that comes up is the issue of sovereignty, and I know in our
State Department issues have come up of how can we eliminate
some of these dictators or rulers peacefully and what would be
the impact if you do prosecute Pinochet? Would they leave their
positions without additional bloodshed, and whether you are go-
ing to take one person rather than look at it globally and how
many you can save by not effectively going after a "Papa Doc" 2
or someone else?
2 Duvalier, Frangois (1907-1971), Haitian political leader and physician,
known as Papa Doc. Elected president of Haiti in 1957 and in 1964 had himself
declared president for life. His dictatorial regime oversaw military and govern-
mental purges and mass executions. The constitution was amended to allow his
son, Jean Claude Duvalier, to succeed him.
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MR. ELLMAN: Thank you. I will come back. If we may,
we will take two or three questions and then come back on that
very interesting point.
QUESTION: The theory has been expressed, particularly
with respect to South America and perhaps with respect to
Southeast Asia, that one of the most promising routes for the
advancement of the human rights cause might in fact be
through commercial development, the theory being that laws
designed to protect international commerce and trade require
the neutral application of law, and indeed, if only slowly,
through respect for the rule of law and the willingness of the
judiciary to protect property interests against the state. I am
just wondering what the panelists from their different perspec-
tives think of that argument? It is not an argument that is uni-
versally shared, obviously, but whether they view in countries
that are particularly repressive of commercial activity, commer-
cial expansion, and the law's protection of that activity as a
promising avenue for the expansion of human rights?
MR. ELLMAN: Thank you. There is a question in the
back.
QUESTIONER: Following up on the Pinochet question,
how has that affected the situation of human rights in Spain
and discussions about human rights in Spain, and within the
judiciary if there is any talk of other, similar cases that might
be taken on by Judge Garzon 3 or other judges against people
like Pinochet.
MR. ELLMAN: Who would like to respond on that? Do you
want to say something, and then I will come in, or anyone else.
MR. MONTALVO: [Spanish - not transcribed].
INTERPRETER: I will try to sum up.
What our guest speaker has said is that he is not sure what
Judge Garzon will do, but it is a reality that it is in the courts,
and also it is a reality that there is backing of the European
Community. It is a difficult topic to approach without sover-
eignty, obviously, but it is in effect something that we will
address.
MR. ELLMAN: I would just like to add to that, to answer
the other question that was raised about Pinochet whether in
3 Investigative Magistrate Judge Baltasar Garzon, from Madrid, Spain.
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fact by prosecuting him other dictators will hang onto power
even longer - if I understood, that is what you meant.
I am afraid that we have not seen many dictators let go of
power partly because people like President Moi in Kenya 4 and
President Mugabe5 in Zimbabwe, to name but a couple, are ter-
rified that if they let go, then people will find even more skele-
tons in their cupboards.
I do not think the fact that Pinochet is going to be prose-
cuted, or may be prosecuted, will add to their concerns. I think
they are already worried about it. And I think that if we fail to
prosecute on the ground that it might scare some others into an
even more reactionary hold on power, then we would miss an
opportunity for establishing some sort of freedom and re-
pressing impunity.
Going on to the other question that was raised about com-
mercial development and property interests and so forth, I
think we have to be very, very careful in this. The West has,
over the last few years, decided not to complain so much about
China, for example, about the breaches of human rights in
China, in the hope that a so-called "constructive engagement"
might reduce the severity and number of these breaches.
In fact, I think most Sinologists and China watchers would
agree that that has not been the case; the opposite has been the
case, that the repression has continued. Every now and then,
when there is a little bit more pressure put from the West or
when there is some big occasion coming up, such as Clinton's
and Tony Blair's visit to China, China shows a little bit of good-
will. They have now, I think, signed the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.
So I am not saying that we must totally boycott them or
totally put pressure on them. It has to be a mixture. But I
think that the idea that if we simply sit back and do trade with
them then everything will be fine is a very dangerous one, and
we must constantly keep reminding them of their obligations.
And when we do trade with them - as, indeed, when we are
doing trade with and producing aid for the developing world -
we should say, "We will do this provided, and if we are going to
4 Moi, Daniel arap (1924-), second president of Kenya (1978-).
5 Mugabe, Robert Gabriel (1924- ), first prime minister of Zimbabwe (1980-
1987), and first president of Zimbabwe (1987-).
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give you aid or trade with you, we must see some quid pro quo."
It could be done in as tactful and careful a way as you like, but
it must be done.
I do not know if other members of the panel would like to
comment.
DR. MUGRABY: I would like to add a comment. There
was practically a scandal in Britain last year over the order to
deport a Saudi dissident because it was established that that
order was obtained under the heavy pressure of some commer-
cial entities that had fat contracts with Saudi Arabia. When
that was established, the order was rescinded. It was really - I
do not know if Mr. Ellman has followed the situation closely,
but it was a scandal of major proportion.
It is often the private interests that have the incentive to
corrupt the policies of their home governments by making sure
that they take such policy positions as will be conducive to their
commercial interests. I think the industrialized Western coun-
tries are not in such great need of these contracts anymore.
MR. ELLMAN: Thank you. I entirely agree with your com-
ments on that. In fact, the government hoped that they could
quietly deport this man to the West Indies and hoped that eve-
rybody would forget about it, under pressure from commercial,
and particularly from Saudi commercial, interests. In fact, they
had to scrap that attempted deportation, and the Saudis contin-
ued to trade with us just as before.
DR. MUGRABY: Absolutely.
MR. ELLMAN: And I think the threat of certain Chilean
businesses to cease trading with Britain and with Spain be-
cause of this prosecution will be a very temporary thing. Even
if one or two contracts are canceled in the short term, very soon
they will come back to it, and we must not allow ourselves to be
put off by this sort of blackmail.
QUESTION: With various recent emergency special ses-
sions of the United Nations, the nations of the world, with the
exception of the United States and Israel, have begun consulta-
tions, with the help of Switzerland and the International Red
Cross, to consider how the Fourth Geneva Convention might be
enforced in regard to the territories that were occupied in 1967,
approximately. I am not sure quite how it was decided - and I
know that there was a meeting of experts at the end of October,
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not reported very much in the American press. I think the peo-
ple here may be able to tell us more about it, especially about
what may be following that.
DR. MUGRABY: I am not technically competent to answer
that question. But I can tell you that, as regards the West
Bank, there had been a very unusual legal situation. After the
war of 1948, the West Bank was annexed by the King of Trans-
jordan, and as a result of that the name of the kingdom was
changed from Transjordan to Jordan.
Then, the PLO in the 1960s was established by a decree of
the Arab League. That was a resolution by the Arab League to
establish the PLO. It is not a self-founded organization. The
Arab League decided to give the PLO the rights over the West
Bank.
In the meantime, Jordan, by joining in the 1967 war, had
lost the West Bank, lost military control of the West Bank.
Consequently, when the Arab League gave responsibility for the
West Bank to the PLO, the Government of Jordan renounced its
claim on the West Bank.
So a very peculiar legal situation arose whereby you had
this territory, which is called "the territories," where the former
sovereign, that is Jordan, had renounced its sovereignty over it.
The party that was proclaimed as the new owner was not a
state but a political organization.
Of course, the Arab position on Israel was at that time sum-
marized in the famous "Three Nos" of the Khartoum Proclama-
tion by the heads of state that convened after the 1967 horrible
defeat. The "Three Nos" were no to recognition, no to negotia-
tion, no to - I don't know what.
With that negative attitude, Israel was left in full control of
the West Bank. Since the great legal minds of the Arab League
member governments had continued to decide that Israel did
not exist, they were not at all willing to not only negotiate, but
to call on Israel to exercise its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions.
And so, these new procedures are procedures which are
coming a bit too late, but I hope that the peace negotiations
would make them totally unnecessary, because the purpose re-
ally is to reach peace. If in 1948, like I said in my presentation,
the world powers had encouraged the parties to enter into a
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peace agreement, which they could have done very easily -
they could have done that like that - instead of the armistice,
then we would have been living today in a much happier Middle
East, with no military governments, with much less oppression
and so forth.
QUESTION: Professor Mugraby, don't you think that in
the two different cases that we have discussed recently regard-
ing the sovereign immunity law of the United States of 1976 -
for example, when the court of appeals did not grant immunity
in the case of Nelson v. Saudi Arabia,6 it was because South
Arabia was acting in their commercial capacity not in their sov-
ereign capacity.
In the other case of Pinochet, the British law of 1978 on
immunity was exactly the opposite. That is to say, immunity
was not granted to General Pinochet because sovereign immu-
nity did not include the torture or killings almost 1,000 people.
So it is exactly the opposite. Immunity was not denied because
of commercial purposes absent in the sovereign immunity law,
but because it is not included in the general concept of sovereign
immunity to act as a president or, in the case of General Pi-
nochet, for acts of torture or acts of death.
MR. ELLMAN: Did you want to add something on that
point?
QUESTION: Yes. In the case of Nelson v. Saudi Arabia,7
on the federal appellate level, I think the decision found that it
was a commercial activity. The State Department, with Starr
being the prosecutor, acted for Saudi Arabia, and I do not know
what issues were raised on the national level here. The
Supreme Court, I believe by a six-to-three decision, upheld the
issue of act of state, and this allowed a commercial activity,
which raises the issue of whether our country should legisla-
tively allow for a human rights exception under FSIA, the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act.
DR. MUGRABY: There is confusion here, if I may say, be-
tween two different concepts, between the concept of diplomatic
immunity and the very new concept of sovereign immunity. Ac-
tually, what they teach in law school is diplomatic immunity,
6 923 F.2d 1528 (11 th Cir. 1991).
7 Id.
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and diplomatic immunity does not hold when the state is
trading.
QUESTIONER: In commercial affairs.
DR. MUGRABY: In commercial affairs. The question of
sovereign immunity I think is being raised for the first time in
these situations. It is not a question of sovereign immunity; it
is a question of diplomatic immunity.
This is really a new concept that tries to say that people
who are involved in acts of state can benefit from some type of
imaginary immunity. It is different. It is just diplomatic immu-
nity, and diplomatic immunity is accorded to sitting heads of
state.
Before this ruling in Britain - and someone should correct
me - I have not seen any authority.
MR. ELLMAN: I would only add that one of the most sig-
nificant things about the House of Lords decision was that I
think it was Lord Nicholls - who we hadn't expected to come
out against the immunity of Pinochet, but, to our surprise and
delight, he did - he said, "We have to recognize that interna-
tional law is developing." This is a very significant thing, for a
British judge who is normally extremely conservative, to say,
"We recognize that progress is being made, that change is
happening."
That perhaps may explain to some extent the difference be-
tween the U.S. practice - if indeed it is different; I am not sure
that it is - and this new British interpretation of international
law.
I would like to thank you all very much for a very interest-
ing discussion and thank the panelists for their invaluable
contributions.
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Compliment
A 16 month old Burundian refugee, who was bayonetted by
Burundian soldiers, is taken to the hospital in Rwanda. A man
is holding the baby on his lap in a car. He was taken to Rwanda
by his mother, who was also seriously wounded, to escape a
massacre of Hutu tribesmen by the Burundian army.
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